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Explicating the Interactions between the Auditor and Client 
Management during the Audit Process: Implications for 
Corporate Governance 
 
Dr Emad Awadallah, Business School, University of East London, 
 
The paper is a study of the extent, nature, and outcomes of the interactions between 
auditors and client management during the audit process, and the consequent impact 
on the effectiveness of corporate governance structures in place. A total of 28 semi 
structured interviews were carried out in 8 different sized Egyptian accounting firms. 
The semi-structured interviews were facilitated by the use of a pre-designed interview 
schedule using a very broad topic guide with a few direct questions. The 
interviewees’ responses revealed that it is important for the auditor not only to assess 
the nature of the given dispute and the stage to which the dispute has evolved, but 
also to assess the forces and factors affecting the parties involved. Secondly, when 
resolving audit disputes, interviewees indicated that there is no single negotiation 
strategy that can be applied in all situations. The findings should be treated with 
some caution since the interviews were conducted with only one group of subjects, 
namely 28 Egyptian auditors of Big 4 and other audit firms. Accordingly, the issue 
remains open as to whether the interviewees’ perceptions can be generalized to the 
whole population or to other groups (for instance, finance directors or shareholders). 
Most of the previous studies have been conducted in developed, Anglo-Saxon 
countries, therefore there is an opportunity for more research to be carried out in 
other countries, specifically in developing countries, namely Egypt, thus providing 
additional evidence on this issue. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Auditors and their clients often encounter situations in which professional standards 
allow for different judgements about the appropriate treatment of accounting 
transactions (Johnstone and Muzatko, 2002). For example, auditors and their clients 
may disagree on the proper valuation of inventory or accounts receivable, because 
both parties may make different judgements regarding inventory obsolescence or the 
allowance for doubtful accounts. In such situations, auditors and their clients 
generally seek ways to resolve their disagreements. Furthermore, it may be argued 
that both parties generally benefit from a strong, long-term relationship with the other; 
auditors gain valuable client-specific knowledge that may aid them to conduct their 
audits effectively and efficiently, and clients avoid the costs associated with switching 
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auditors. Therefore, it is in both parties’ interests to resolve, via discussion and 
negotiation, accounting issues, over which they have a dispute, whenever possible. 
However, it is important to note that in situations where companies issue financial 
statements that are materially incorrect there could be very significant legal and 
reputation costs to both client management and the auditor. As such, negotiations in 
order to present a representational faithful view of the client’s financial status would 
seem to be an important goal for both auditors and client management (Johnstone 
and Muzatko, 2002). Nonetheless, in the process of expressing an opinion on the 
client’s financial statements, a certain amount of conflict between the auditor and 
client management could possibly arise (Gibbins, Salterio, and Webb, 2001; Wright 
and Wright, 1997). Before the auditor is willing to provide an unqualified audit report, 
any issues that have arisen throughout the audit process must be resolved. During 
the resolution process, client management is likely to attempt to persuade the auditor 
to accept the client management position. 
 
The early independence literature (see for e.g. Goldman and Barlev, 1974; Nichols 
and Price, 1976) modelled the auditor’s ability to withstand pressure from a client 
when resolving issues as a function of the client’s sources of power relative to the 
auditor’s sources of power. Thus, as Murnighan and Bazerman (1990) point out, 
when negotiating with the client, the auditor is faced with incentives to cooperate and 
incentives to compete. One factor influencing auditor’s ability to resist client 
management pressure is the strength of the corporate governance structures in 
place. A corporate governance structure is an institutional mechanism applied at the 
company level to provide assurance to third-party users that independence is being 
preserved. Corporate governance mechanisms include board of directors and audit 
committee involvement in establishing and maintaining the appropriate auditor-client 
management relationship and in overseeing the conduct of the audit. Appropriately 
functioning boards of directors and audit committees should provide a neutral, well 
informed buffer between auditors and management (Johnstone, Sutton, and 
Warfield, 2001). One of the benefits of strong corporate governance is the 
enhancement of auditor independence. 
 
A strong and active audit committee comprising independent members can act as an 
intermediary between the auditor and client management in the event of a dispute. In 
this sense, the paper is a study of the extent, nature, and outcomes of the 
interactions between auditors and clients during the audit process, and the 
consequent impact on the effectiveness of Corporate Governance structures in 
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place. The basic components of the interactions that are investigated are the 
contextual factors affecting audit disputes, in terms of how they develop, are 
discussed and negotiated and the impact of these disputes on auditors’ ability to 
withstand client management pressure, and the negotiation strategies the auditor 
may adopt when dealing with audit disputes with the ultimate aim of assessing the 
effectiveness of Corporate Governance structures in place. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Disputes between auditor and client management that may arise in the course of an 
audit regarding proper accounting treatment, presentation, disclosure, etc., are often 
resolved by referring to appropriate accounting rules or guidelines. However, 
because each disputable situation often involves unique circumstances, the 
resolution of such conflicts may also be affected by several factors that affect the 
relative negotiating power of the two parties. Two groups of factors may affect 
auditors’ decisions in such situations – those factors from which the client derives 
power (such as the ability to negotiate the auditor/client contract in a market 
characterized by the presence of competing audit firms) and those from which the 
auditor may derive power (such as the strength of the corporate governance 
structure in place, transaction costs to replace the incumbent auditor, start-up costs 
for a new auditor and loss of the expertise of the incumbent auditor). 
 
Nonetheless, auditors’ ability to withstand client pressure is a function, among other 
things, of the relative power of the client management and the auditor who are 
parties to the disagreement. Compared to many other professional groups, Goldman 
and Barlev (1974) argue that auditors are in a relatively weak position in disputes 
with their clients because they operate usually in a very competitive market and 
produce a product (i.e., the audit opinion) that is perceived as being basically 
homogeneous. The existence of competing audit firms who are ready to replace 
them provides a major source of the clients’ power – the threat, supported by the 
ability, to replace auditors with a competitor if a disagreement occurs over either a 
professional matter or a fee dispute (see for e.g. Goldman and Barlev, 1974; Gul, 
1991; Knapp, 1985). Furthermore, audit firm size is also believed to affect auditors’ 
ability to resist management pressure. Gul (1991) found that bankers expected that 
large auditing firms would have greater ability to withstand management pressure 
compared to small audit firms. 
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Nevertheless, sources of negotiating power may not rest solely with the client. Most 
audit firms also provide additional non-audit services to many clients, including their 
audit clients. Although the client may be able to obtain the additional services 
elsewhere, the client may be reluctant to seek a replacement if the additional 
services are specialized in nature because of the transactions costs involved both in 
searching for the replacement and in the replacement’s learning their particular 
norms, systems and needs. Another factor influencing auditor’s ability to resist client 
management pressure is the strength of the corporate governance structures in 
place. One of the benefits of strong corporate governance is the enhancement of 
auditor independence. A strong and active audit committee comprising independent 
members can act as an intermediary between the auditor and client management in 
the event of a dispute. Yet, if auditors were, beyond doubt, independent of their client 
this debate would end here, but, apparently, they are not. The researcher argues that 
client management effectively influence, in an indirect way, the appointment of the 
company’s auditors and also effectively influence, indirectly, the determination of the 
size of the audit fee. Thus, if the auditors conclude that the financial statements do 
not show a true and fair view and qualify their audit opinion, they know that there is a 
possibility either of losing the audit or of having their fee reduced. On the other hand, 
there is also a sense of loyalty that is built up between an auditor and the managers 
being audited (Moizer, 1997). 
 
Despite the vast amount of research (see for e.g. Awadallah, 2006; Knapp, 1985; 
Lindsay, 1990; Shockley, 1981) that is concerned with the theoretical identification 
and empirical testing of variables affecting auditors’ ability to withstand pressure from 
client management, few studies (see for e.g. Beattie, Brandt, and Fearnley, 2004; 
Gibbins, Salterio, and Webb, 2001) have focused on the negotiation process that 
takes place between the auditor and client management in order to reach an 
outcome. Research on negotiation is increasing in recent years. The increased 
interest has arisen because of such negotiations’ impact on information released to 
capital markets and other users, and because of recent concerns about the 
auditors’independence and ability to withstand client management pressure (see for 
e.g. Beattie, Fearnley, and Brandt, 2000; Gibbins, Salterio, and Webb, 2001). 
Fundamentally, accounting studies concerning interactions between auditors and 
client management have used a variety of different methods, have focused upon 
different interaction stages, and have investigated interactions between staff at 
different levels on both sides of the relationship. The review of previous relevant 
literature revealed a lack in studies addressing the effect of the factors affecting 
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auditor’s independence on the chosen negotiation strategy. Most of the previous 
auditing studies were either concerned with the factors that may impair auditor’s 
independence or with the negotiation process per se. Furthermore, most of the 
previous studies have been conducted in developed, Anglo-Saxon countries leading 
to the notion that there is much room for more research to be carried out in other 
countries, specifically in developing countries, to explore any cross-cultural 
similarities or differences that might exist; thus providing additional evidence on this 
issue in order to reduce the frequency of conflict in the audit context as well as how 
to manage this phenomenon in a constructive manner, which, in turn, could benefit 
all parties with a stake in ensuring effective corporate governance. 
 
3. Methodology and Research Design 
 
The current research was based on conducting personal semi-structured interviews 
where an interview schedule has been prepared; however, the questions were left 
open-ended. This form of interviewing has been chosen for two reasons; first there 
was a list of issues about the auditor-client negotiation relationship that needed 
investigation. Second, the questions related to these issues could not be answered in 
form of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ or any other pre-determined form. Rather, open-ended questions 
were more relevant to allow the interviewees to express their opinions freely. 
Moreover, this gave those interviewed the opportunity to discuss the issues in a way 
they could control. The interview schedule was developed based on audit concepts 
selected from the literature and previous empirical studies. The basic components of 
the interactions that are investigated are the contextual factors affecting audit 
disputes, in terms of how they develop, are discussed and negotiated and the impact 
of these disputes on auditors’ ability to withstand client management pressure, and 
the negotiation strategies the auditor may adopt when dealing with audit disputes. A 
total of 28 semi-structured interviews were carried out in 8 different sized accounting 
firms. Agreement was obtained from the eight firms of accountants to participate in 
the study and interviews were conducted with 4 partners and 7 senior managers from 
two of the ‘Big 4’ accounting firms, 6 partners and 7 senior managers from 4 medium 
sized firms of accountants, and, finally, 4 senior managers from 2 small-sized firms of 
accountants. The level of partners and managers was chosen because the results of 
the pilot study interviews indicated that if auditors were to choose a certain 
negotiation strategy during the audit process; this would be selected by the partner or 
the manager. 
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4. Discussion of Findings 
 
In explicating the issue of audit disputes and its impact on the effectiveness of 
Corporate Governance structures in place, the discussion was under three main 
headings: nature of the audit dispute and the factors underlying it, development 
stages of the audit dispute, and applied negotiation strategies to deal with the audit 
dispute. On one hand, when asked about the nature of the audit dispute and what 
might be the factors that lead to the argument, the interviewees elicited three main 
factors that cause audit disputes. These include disagreement over informational 
factors, disagreement over perceptual factors, and disagreement over role factors. 
The informational factors exert their influences when the various points of view have 
developed on the basis of different sets of facts, whereas the perceptual factors exert 
their influence when the persons have different images of the same stimulus. Finally, 
the role factors exert their influence because each of the individuals occupies a 
certain position and status in the relationship between them. The fact that he or she 
occupies such a position or status may put certain constraints on him or her if the 
discussion is related to his or her role. 
 
On the other hand, the interviewees’ responses, on aggregate, revealed that the 
audit dispute passes through five main stages, in the sense that each stage leads 
either to the conflict being resolved or the conflict being complicated, thus moving to 
the following stage. In addition, it was deduced that there are some certain forces 
and factors affecting the auditor’s position in each stage. Those forces and factors 
determine to a large extent the outcome of the dispute. The forces are mainly 
represented by the effectiveness of the corporate governance structure’s role in 
handling the situation, and the factors are represented by the balance of power 
between the auditor and client management. Hence, it was deducted that it is 
important for the auditor not only to assess the nature of the given dispute and the 
stage to which the dispute has evolved, but also to assess the forces and factors 
surrounding it. Finally, based on the dual concerns model and its associated five 
strategies, i.e. collaborating, competing, avoiding, accommodating, and 
compromising, it was concluded from the interviewees’ responses, that there is no 
single strategy that can be adopted in all situations as this would depend on each 
case individually and on the factors surrounding it. This was because, as reflected 
from the interviewees’ responses, the nature of audit disputes is not the same. 
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Consequently, each audit dispute has its unique circumstances; the resolution of 
such conflicts is affected by several influences that affect the choice of an 
appropriate negotiation strategy. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Conflict between client management and the audit firm is apparently occurring with 
increasing frequency (Beattie, Fearnley, and Brandt, 2000; Gibbins, Salterio, and 
Webb, 2001). The central argument here is the way auditors deal with these conflicts 
and the effect – if any – on their ability to resist client management pressure. Large 
financial failures and accounting scandals suggest potential conflicts that have 
reduced the effectiveness of corporate governance, the reliability of financial 
statements, and, ultimately, investor confidence. Policy makers have responded with 
unusual speed by passing numerous new regulations. Yet, many of these regulations 
changes have occurred without much consideration of evidence provided by the 
extant empirical research literature. Thus, if audit firms are to retain their important 
role in the financial reporting process, more research needs to be undertaken. The 
findings and conclusions of the semi-structured interviews should be treated with 
some caution since the interviews were conducted with only one group of subjects, 
namely 28 Egyptian auditors of Big 4 and non Big 4 audit firms. Accordingly, the 
issue remains open as to whether the interviewees’ perceptions can be generalized 
to the whole population or to other groups (for instance, shareholders). Of more 
concern, as the population surveyed was exclusively comprised of Egyptian auditors, 
whose experience would be based on Egyptian rules, practices and procedures, the 
results and analysis are not necessarily applicable to other jurisdictions. For instance, 
other factors such as cultural differences of the interviewees’ personal characters 
and experience may have a significant impact on auditors’ choice of the appropriate 
negotiation strategy to be applied in audit disputes. In other words, Egyptian auditors 
may perceive these disputes in a different light from their counterparts in other 
countries, suggesting that need for more research. Another primary limitation in the 
interviews is that the main focus was on factors perceived as impairing auditors’ 
independence. Future research could be undertaken to identify other factors that may 
enhance independence. Further, the interviews held, when dealing with the issue of 
negotiation strategies, focused on the dual concerns model and its associated five 
strategies. Further research could be undertaken to explore the issue through 
applying any other relevant models, for instance, the Thomas-Kilmann Instrument. 
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